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Abstract
Computer viruses pose a considerable problem for
users of personal computers. The recent emergence
of macro viruses as a problem of some importance
may heighten virus awareness in general. Yet most
people have little or no understanding of common
anti-virus measures, the varieties of viruses that
exist today, and the strategies which they use to accomplish infection and to defeat anti-viruses. It is
well-known that the virus problem is most severe for
users of IBM PCs and compatibles; however, users
of other platforms, such as the Macintosh, should
not become complacent - viruses exist for many
platforms in varying numbers. The ease with which
macro viruses may be written is discussed, and a
new virus attack for the Macintosh is presented
which closely resembles an attack under DOS for
the PC.
Keywords Computer science, computer virus,
computer viruses, macro VIruses, companion
VIruses.

1

What is a Computer Virus?

There is some difficulty in producing a definition
for the term "computer virus". Dr. Cohen has
presented a mathematical definition of a computer
virus, which may be roughly expressed as:
A virus is a program that can 'infect'
other programs by modifying them to
include a possibly evolved version of
itself. [4]
However, this definition classifies as viruses many
things which would not be considered viruses by
those working in the anti-virus field. At the same
time this definition would not consider as viruses
programs that infect another without modifying
the target program itself [2] (an example of such
a virus are the companion viruses, discussed in
Section 3).
Proceedings of the 20th Australasian Computer
Science Conference, Sydney, Australia, February 5-7 1997.

Additionally, the above definition does not convey any need for the "virus" to be able to replicate
further once it has infected some other program
[2] - and replication is viewed as an important
characteristic of a true "computer virus" .
A definition which is felt to be more practically
useful when dealing with "real" computer viruses
than Dr. Cohen's mathematical model is:
We define a computer 'virus' as a selfreplicating program that can 'infect'
other programs by modifying them or
their environment such that a call to
an 'infected' program implies a call
to a possibly evolved, and in most
cases, functionally similar copy of the
'virus'. [21, 2]
The term 'infect' is used with respect to computer viruses in the sense of the definition above
throughout the remainder of this document.
It is important to note that a virus is not necessarily malicious - although it may have side
effects (as a result of the virus clashing with the
operating system, user programs and extensions
to the standard operating system installed by the
user) which are deemed to be undesirable.
Some researchers have been considering the
question of viruses that perform useful actions
- so-called benevolent viruses. Cohen [4, pp.
15-21] considers briefly the topic of benevolent
viruses. He considers as examples:
Compression viruses little-used files are
compressed by the virus and uncompressed
when required.
Maintenance viruses - any virus which would
perform maintenance tasks in a computer system, such as updating installed programs.
Distributed Databases with viruses viruses would reproduce on networked
computers, performing searches for the virus'
originator. Results would be reported back
by mail, and the virus would clean itself up
after a certain time.

The use of viruses in covert distributed data
processing (specifically, key cracking on encrypted
messages) has been proposed by White [13]. It
may be argued, however, that this would not be
particularly beneficial to the user whose resources
are used by the virus.
Many arguments against the idea of benevolent
viruses are presented by Bontchev [2].

2

Worms, Trojan Horses, Droppers
and Logic Bombs

A worm is an independent program that is able to
spread copies of itself or of parts of itself to other
computers, commonly across network connections,
and these copies are themselves fully functional independent programs, which are capable either of
spreading further and/or of communicating with
the parent worm (to report back results of some
computation, for example).
There is often confusion over the distinction between a worm and a virus. For example, the
program that negatively affected the Internet in
November 1988 is referred to as a virus ("the Internet Virus") by some [5] and as a worm ("the Internet Worm") by others [11, 12, 10]. Spafford [12]
argues that referring to the infection as a "worm"
rather than a "virus" is most appropriate.
A notable difference between worm programs
(such as the Internet Worm) and viruses is that
while a virus may take advantage of network connections to infect other programs (some local area
networks are particularly susceptible, as the user is
able to interact with programs and data stored on
a remote machine as if they were available locally),
it is not capable of causing its code to execute on
a remote machine. Clearly the well-known worms
have been able to cause their programs to be executed on the remote machine which was the worm's
target.
The Internet Worm affected Sun 3 and VAX
systems running variants ofBSD UNIX [11]. Other
worms have been created with other networks in
mind, such as DECnet [7].
A trojan horse is a program which possesses
various intentional undocumented features! whose
effects few users of the software would appreciate
were these undocumented features to manifest
themselves.
Unlike a computer virus, which
attaches itself to some other program using any
of a number of methods, a trojan horse is a
self-contained program. A trojan horse may have
functions of use to the user.
Some definitions of "trojan horse" define a computer virus as a replicating trojan horse which inserts a copy of itself into some other program [1].
1 As opposed to bugs in the program, otherwise known as
"unintentional undocumented features" .

A trojan horse might install a virus as its intentional undocumented action. Some feel that a
program which installs a virus as a result of having
been previously infected with the virus is also a
trojan horse (having been converted into a trojan horse by the virus) [18]. However, this seems
incompatible with the notion of a "trojan horse"
being a program which was initially produced with
an intentional undocumented feature in place.
A dropper is a program which acts as a carrier
for a computer virus. A dropper is not the result of
a normal infection of some program by a virus - it
exists only to spread the virus. The virus is usually
kept by the dropper in a form which will not be
detected by anti-virus software [18]. Some macro
viruses (see Section 3) attempt to act as a dropper
for more conventional varieties of viruses [15], in
addition to whatever other actions they perform.

3

Varieties of Viruses

There are a number of different ways that viruses
use to infect a computer system. The two main
types of viruses are:
File Infectors: These are VIruses that attach
themselves to some form of executable code.
There is a variety of ways in which a virus
might attempt to infect a file. On a DOSbased system, file infectors will commonly
attach themselves to . COM or . EXE files,
although there are many other kinds of
infect able objects.
Boot Sector Infectors: Only discussed in the
context of a PC-compatible system. These
kinds of viruses infect executable code which is
loaded from disk and called when a computer
is starting up. There are a number of different
pieces of code which may be modified by a
virus to infect a system, such as:
• DOS boot sector [floppy disks and hard
disks].
• Master Boot Record (MBR) [hard disks
only].
• Partition table [hard disks only].
A virus that is capable of spreading by infecting
files and by infecting via any code executed at boot
time is known as a multipartite virus.
Boot sector viruses are extremely widespread;
as a group they are easily the most commonly found
variety of virus on PC-compatible systems.
A virus may be direct-action or resident [18].
A direct-action virus is one that when initiallyexecuted in the course of normal use of a computer
system identifies executable objects for infection
and exits once infection has been accomplished.

Direct-action viruses may also be referred to as
non-resident viruses.
A resident virus is one which installs itself somewhere in memory, and makes arrangements for the
virus body in memory to be executed at some future time; the virus may infect files or take other
action (to conceal its presence, for example) at the
time it is next executed. For example, some Macintosh viruses if resident in memory will infect an
application when that application commences running and performs certain system calls that initialise the Macintosh Toolbox, which consists of a
set of utility functions available to all applications.
Some programs useful to the user are also resident programs - this includes some antivirus programs that monitor computer system operations
f~r actions which may indicate the presence of a
VIrus.
There are some other types of viruses which
should be mentioned:
Macro Viruses: These are explained in detail in
Section 4. The ease with which such a virus
may be written is discussed in Section 9.2.
File System or Cluster Viruses: Rather than
infecting files directly, such a virus modifies
directory table information so that the virus
is executed first. It would then pass control
to the program that the caller really wants
so as to avoid rapid detection. "Dir-II" IS an
example of this variety of virus. [18]
Kernel Viruses: These are viruses that target a
specific feature of an operating system's kernel
(the program(s) that represent the heart of an
operating system). [18]
Companion Viruses: Companion viruses occur
in several varieties [3, 8], the most notable
being:
Regular Companion: Creates a file in the
same directory as the target of infection
but with a filename extension which the
operating system chooses to execute be. fore the original file (for example, under
DOS a . COM file is executed before a . EXE
file with the same name). This would
appear to be an attack which is highly
specific to PCs running DOS.
PATH Companion: Create a file with any
executable extension in a directory that
is searched for executable files before the
directory containing the target of infection (named after the PATH environment
variables found in operating systems such
as DOS and UNIX).

Obviously, not all of these infection strategies
are available on some platforms and operating systems. For example, Macintosh computers do not
suffer from companion viruses as described above
in any form, and also don't appear to be afflicted
with viruses of the boot sector variety.
All viruses, with the exception of macro viruses,
are platform dependent.

4

Macro Viruses

The anti-virus community has been aware for some
time now ofthe potential for virus-writing provided
by the scripting (or macro) languages of large software packages such as Microsoft Word and Excel
The idea of macro viruses was first introduced by
Highland [6].
However, it is only recently that such viruses
have become a problem.
These viruses are
remarkable for the fact that they infect what are
usually thought of as documents. A macro virus
may also be platform independent, being capable
of spreading on any computer platform supported
by the host application. The most well-known and
widespread are Microsoft Word viruses written
in WordBasic (two examples are Concept and
Nuclear).
Microsoft Word recognises the existence of two
different forms of user file - an ordinary document,
and a template. A template is very much like an
ordinary document, with the addition that templates may also contain macros written in WordBasic. Ordinary documents may be converted easily
into templates, but the reverse is not the case.
Word has a "global template" , the so-called "Normal template", which is used by every document
created, and is important for the spread of macro
viruses - the macros that make up the virus are
copied into the Normal template where they are
subsequently available to other documents.
Word macros may be marked as ExecuteOnly
which means that the macros cannot be easil;
edited or inspected by a Word user but can only be
executed. Some viruses, for example the Nuclear
virus, use this method to hinder casual analysis of
the viral macros.
Macro viruses in Microsoft Word exploit the existence of several varieties of macros within WordBasic [15]:
• The AutoExec macro, stored within some
global template such as the Normal template,
which is executed automatically whenever
Word is started.
• "Auto" macros, which run whenever certain
user actions take place within Word:
- AutoNew runs when a new document is
created.

- AutoOpen runs when an existing document is opened.
- AutoClose runs
document is closed.

when

an

open

- AutoExit runs before Word exits when
the user quits.
• Macros named for Word menu options, which
are run when the menu option is selected.
A basic Word virus is not difficult to create,
requiring just one macro. The macro virus DMV
features a single macro AutoClose. The Normal
template will be infected when a document
containing the DMV AutoClose macro is closed.
Subsequently, documents are infected as they
are closed [15]. Concept, a more complicated
macro virus, signals its initial infection of the
Normal template, and subsequently will infect
any document with the viral macros when the
document is saved using the "Save as ... " option
of the "File" menu (an example of a virus using a
macro named for a Word menu option).
Some macro viruses, such as DMV and Concept do nothing but spread. Some would argue
that even this is damaging, in terms of the time
required to remove the virus macros from whatever
documents have been infected. More damaging
actions are certainly possible, however. For example, a virus might delete paragraphs from a document, or rearrange or insert words (the Nuclear
virus will append some lines of text to documents
when printed at a certain time). More sophisticated macro viruses attempt to infect the user's
computer with an ordinary variety of virus which
infects executable files (the Nuclear virus unsuccessfully attempts to do this), however behaviour
such as this is platform dependent.
A virus can also give itself some (limited)
protection against being removed by implementing
a ToolsMacro macro, which is then executed in
place of the corresponding menu option should
it be selected by the user. This menu command
offers one possible way for macros to be removed
from a document, if the environment has not
already been infected by a virus.
Disabling of the features of Microsoft Word
which allow automatic execution of certain macros
when documents are opened and closed offers
some limited protection, but as macro viruses can
be written with macros that mask menu options
(macros which cannot be disabled in the same
way that automatic macros may), this is hardly a
complete solution.

5

Virus Occurrences

There have been a great many viruses created for
many different computer platforms. The PC has

by far the largest share of all the viruses in existence (the producers of Dr. Solomon's Anti- Virus
Toolkit, a leading anti-virus package, claim to detect 9417 PC viruses [20]).
Many of these PC viruses are closely related
(once a virus becomes available, it is not uncommon
to find a number of copycat viruses that differ only
slightly from the original appearing, perhaps written by less-skilled virus writers using virus source
code; alternatively, the virus author might release
a number of viruses with different payloads but
sharing common code for infection and anti-antivirus measures).
Some information has been gathered by Virus
Bulletin about PC viruses that have been reported
as found over the course of a month for some
months. The percentage of the reports made up
by the various virus classes for several months of
1996 are shown in Table 1 [22].
Macro
Boot
Multi partite
File
Other
Unclassified

Jun.
21.8
62.5
7.3
8.4
0.0
0.0

Jul.
18.4
64.5
10.6
4.8
0.3
1.3

Aug.
20.2
59.2
13.9
6.4
0.0
0.4

Sep.
34.3
53.7
6.6
4.8
0.0
0.6

Table 1: % of reports to/collected by Virus Bulletin
made up by various classes of virus.
Only a very few of the total number of known
viruses are responsible for the majority of virus
incidents. Some on-access anti-virus products use
this fact to help restrict the number of viruses that
a file must be checked for when accessed by a user.
Viruses exist for a number of other personal
computer platforms, such as the Amiga and the
Macintosh, but the numbers of these viruses are
a small fraction of the numbers of viruses available
for the PC. The Macintosh, for example, is afflicted
with only a few dozen viruses. Viruses written to
target UNIX are especially uncommon.

6

Virus
Anti-Detection/ AntiAnalysis Strategies

There are a variety of strategies which a virus might
employ to hinder detection of the virus, and analysis once it has been discovered:
Stealth: While the virus is active in memory, it
can intercept disk reads, and when it detects
an attempt to read a section of the disk (such
as the boot sector, partition table or master
boot record) or a file that has been infected by
the virus, can conceal its presence by returning
as a result of the call data with no signs of
infection. Most stealth viruses are boot sector
viruses (it being much easier to detect reads

of these areas of the disk). Some examples of
stealth viruses are [17]:
• Members of the "Brain" strain of viruses
are stealth floppy boot sector viruses.
• The "512" virus (also known as "Number
of the Beast") is a stealth file infecting
virus.
Polymorphic Viruses: A polymorphic virus is
one that is capable of varying many aspects of
its appearance in the hope of avoiding detection. Cohen refers to viruses of this type as
"evolutionary" viruses [4, p. 73]. The strategies which might be employed by a polymorphic virus are (many of these strategies for
code 'evolution' are explained in greater detail
by Cohen [4, pp. 199-215]):
Encryption: Encrypt the body of the
virus not only with a variety of different
keys but also with a variety of different
encryption strategies (each requiring
a different decryptor, of course). The
encryption approach is a particularly
common polymorphic trick - its wide
use was facilitated by the distribution of
a variety of object code modules (such as
MtE and TPE) which could make any
virus polymorphic. Additionally, this is
the most straightforward polymorphic
strategy which a virus might employ.
One of the many viruses which employs
a strategy of this sort is the "Tequila"
virus [17].
Instruction Equivalence: Some
machine instructions achieve equivalent
effects. Substitute for these equivalent
instructions in the virus code.
Equivalent Instruction Sequences:
Replace one sequence of machine
instructions with another which achieves
the same final result.
Instruction Reordering: Sometimes
it
is possible to reorder a sequence of
instructions in a variety of different ways
and still achieve the same result. The
"1260 virus" is one which alters the
order of instructions in its decryption
routine from infection to infection,
and additionally inserts irrelevant
instructions [17].
Variable Substitutions: Alter
which
memory locations contain each of
the variables used by the program.
Especially effective if the variables are
dispersed about the program.

Add or Remove Jumps: Add
unnecessary jump/branch instructions to
a program while still preserving its
function (this makes the program
longer, of course), or remove existing
jump/branch instructions by moving the
program code which was the destination
of the jump/branch.
Add or Remove Calls: Replace
calls
to subroutines with a copy of the
subroutine; replace a sequence of code
with a subroutine call.
Garbage Insertion: For example, might
or other
add NOP instructions,
instructions which do not otherwise
achieve any useful purpose apart from
obscuring the code's functions.
The
"Tequila" virus employs a strategy of
this sort [17].
Simulation: Replace
an
instruction
sequence with an alternative sequence
which achieves the same effect when
interpreted (or simulated) appropriately.
Build and Execute: 'Build' instructions
somewhere in memory (one byte or
a sequence of bytes at a time) and
then execute them. This obscures the
instructions being constructed from
observation until their execution.
Intermixing Programs: Interleave
the
instructions for separate programs or
blocks of code in such a way that the
interleaved code achieves the same result
as the separate blocks of code.
Tunnelling: A technique sometimes used by
viruses that attempts to bypass activitymonitoring virus detectors (for example,
by bypassing operating system disk access
functions and interpreting the contents of the
disk itself, or calling the operating system's
functions directly to avoid any trap the
activity monitor may have set in place) or
otherwise subvert anti-virus techniques and
strategies.
Cavity Virus: A variety of file infecting virus
which overwrites a portion of the file which
is filled with the same value, such as a region
filled with zero bytes. Such a virus will not
alter the total length of the file.
Antidebugger Mutations: Various tricks can
be employed to make disassembling and
tracing the program code difficult.
For
example, the program code might be arranged
in such a way that an instruction or set of
instructions is hidden from casual inspection,

so that the function of the code is no longer
readily apparent from its disassembly. The
debugger itself could be manipulated in the
course of tracing a program by tampering
with the debugger's address space.
The speed with which a virus reproduces and
infects other files is also important. Some viruses
spread particularly quickly. For example, a virus
might be programmed to infect any executable file
when the file is opened, for whatever reason. These
are the so-called fast infectors.
A slow infector is a virus which only infects
files as they are created, immediately prior to or
following a legitimate change (that is, some change
that the user wants to have happen), or as files are
copied, perhaps onto a floppy disk [3, 9, 18] [4, p.
91].
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Defenses Against and Detection
For Viruses

There are a variety of defenses against viruses, and
ways of detecting their presence. A natural first
question is: "Is it possible to detect all viruses?".
Unfortunately not - it is mentioned in Cohen [4,
pp. 64-68] that it is not possible to construct some
program which correctly determines whether or not
some other program is a virus. In fact, given a
known virus, it isn't even possible to systematically
determine using a computer program if another
program is infected with a virus derived from the
original known virus in some way.
However, there are a variety of imperfect ways
to detect the (possible) presence of computer
viruses. Most forms of virus detection involve false
positives, which occur when an object is identified
as being infected by a virus when in fact it is
clean, and false negatives, which occur when an
object is passed as clean when in fact it has been
infected with a virus. Ideally, false positives and
false negatives will occur very infrequently.
Some techniques, such as scanning for viruses,
often lead to a positive identification of a virus.
In many cases, the infection (and some damage)
caused by the virus is reversible.
Stealth techniques mean that attempts at virus
detection that involve manipulating file objects on
disk will not necessarily be effective if the virus
is present and active in memory. For this reason,
it is recommended that before attempting to detect a virus, the computer in question be rebooted
from an uninfected, locked, floppy disk containing
a clean version of whatever anti-virus software is
needed to search for viruses.
Known-Virus Scanning: Attempts to identify
viruses by scanning files for certain strings
of bytes known to occur in particular

viruses.
Simple scanners which perform
only such searches are easily defeatable by a
well-written and sophisticated polymorphic
virus, so many also employ some more
advanced techniques (such as heuristic
analysis, to detect suspicious code fragments,
or algorithmic analysis, to detect complex
polymorphic viruses). Scanners often have
difficulty detecting new viruses, and they
require frequent updating.
Heuristic Analysis: Attempts
to
identify
a possible virus by looking for code that
performs functions which in combination with
each other are deemed to be suspicious. An
example of a suspicious code fragment would
be one that alters the first few bytes of an
executable file in memory - this would be
required so that an infected executable could
run normally when infected with a virus.
Behaviour Blocker/Monitor: Attempts
to
detect viruses based on patterns of virus
activity.
This approach has problems
because many of the actions performed by
a virus are perfectly legitimate under other
circumstances.
These methods are also
sometimes rendered ineffective if a tunnelling
virus is infecting the system - these viruses
are frequently able to bypass the methods
used by a monitor to detect virus activity.
Integrity Checker/Integrity Shell: Integrity
checking involves collecting a database of
signatures for each file which is likely to
be the target of a virus infection (such as
application programs). If at a later date this
signature can be determined to have changed,
then it is possible that a virus infection has
taken place. This method will not detect
viruses before infection takes place. There are
a variety of enhancements to the basic method
outlined here which must be implemented
(for example, a companion virus does not
necessarily modify the item it "infects". So
integrity checkers must attempt to identify
the presence of a companion virus by other
means). An integrity shell [4, pp. 83-93] is a
more sophisticated approach which involves
checking every object on which some object
X (which the user wishes to use in some way)
depends.
An integrity checker is an example of a generic
anti-virus program - it is not targeted at a specific
virus or class of viruses and so will rarely need
updating. Integrity checking issues are extensively
discussed in papers by Bontchev [3] and Radai [9].
There are a variety of other ways to help prevent
virus infections. For example, as the great major-

ity of PC virus infections are boot sector viruses ,
changing the order in which the computer searches
its disk drives for a boot able disk is an effective
defense in many cases (an apparently common setting is to attempt to boot a floppy disk before
attempting to boot the hard disk). Precautions
will still have to be taken to deal with multipartite
and other non-boot sector viruses, of course.
Cohen outlines a number of strategies that
will prevent or hinder computer viruses spreading
throughout a computer system or computer
network [4, pp. 57-64]. The most interesting of
these approaches is that of limited sharing. The
best that can be done to limit sharing in a transitive
information network that implements sharing is
to base the structure on a "partially ordered set",
or POset. This means that information can flow
in only one direction, for example, from Host A
to Host B but not from Host B to Host A. This
effectively limits the possible range of a viral
infection, and also helps to trace the origin of any
suspected infection, as the source of the infection
would be one of a limited number of machines
which had access to all of the machines on which
the infection was ultimately detected.
The use of a "vaccine" against certain computer
viruses is a technique no longer widely practiced.
Most viruses check a potential infection target to
make sure it is not infected by that particular type
of virus (to prevent multiple infections), so infection by a particular virus could be prevented by
marking executables so that they appeared to be
already infected (hence the name "vaccine"). The
large number of viruses and the fact that some
virus' identification techniques are mutually contradictory means that this technique is no longer
workable.

8

Problems with
and
Attacks
Against Anti-Virus Measures

Virus scanners need updating with great frequency
because of the speed with which new viruses are
created and released. They are popular for a number of reasons:
• A scanner is usually straightforward to use.
Whether or not it is in fact used in the recommended manner is another matter.
• When a virus is detected it can often be positively identified, and many scanners include
facilities for "disinfecting" infected files.
• A scanner is the most reliable means of detecting a known virus in a new file; other techniques are not necessarily applicable (for example, an integrity checker cannot be used to
check a newly-obtained program for viruses,
because there is no way of determining what

the signature of an uninfected program should
be).
A scanner will sometimes perform poorly when attempting to detect unknown viruses.
Polymorphism was at one time an effective
attack against scanners which merely searched
for strings of bytes known to characterise certain
viruses. Cohen states that "until several years after
the MtE was spreading in the world, no scanner
was able to pick up over 95% of infections" [4].
The situation has improved greatly in recent times
- most good scanners are capable of detecting
the majority of polymorphic viruses.
As mentioned in Section 7, stealth viruses may
cause problems if the virus is present in memory
when using a virus scanner or integrity checker,
as files presented for inspection may appear clean
when in fact they are not. Furthermore, a variety
of fast infector stealth virus may take the opportunity presented by the opening of numerous files for
checking to infect those files; this represents a serious cleanup problem in an environment with hundreds (or possibly even thousands) of executable
files. An attempt must be made to identify such
viruses in memory.
Activity monitoring programs require updating
as well, to cope with new virus behaviours. There
are some varieties of virus behaviour which are not
readily detectable by a monitor - such as infecting only files which are about to be modified in
any case. One particular virus, the "Darth Vader"
virus, was designed to avoid alerting an activity
monitor program by attaching itself only to certain
files as they were copied [3]. This also presented an
effective attack against integrity checkers at that
time.
Activity monitors have the additional problems
in that they may flag legitimate actions as suspicious, since the functions used by computer viruses
commonly have legitimate uses as well. They might
also be bypassed by a tunnelling virus or disabled
in memory [3, 9].
Slow infectors are a concern for integrity checking software. The virus infection may go unnoticed,
because the integrity checker doesn't have any signatures in its database with which to compare that
of the (new) file. An example of a common legitimate change to an existing executable file is the addition of patches to the file by an updater program.
Radai [9] suggests that it would be possible to detect the presence of a slow virus by creating a series
of small executable files in the hope that one will
be infected by a slow virus. Copies of the created
executable could be created for easy comparison
with the first. This will not establish which other
newly-created or modified objects are infected with
the slow virus, however. Tracking down the source
of the infection could be problematic.

Programs which cause modifications to their
own executable code will cause problems for
integrity checkers. It is difficult to know how
widely such bad programming habits are practiced
at this time.
Integrity checkers will not be effective against
all types of viruses. As integrity checking is usually
applied only to hard disks (its application to floppy
disks is not practical, as the contents of a floppy
disk are frequently modified) a virus which infects
floppy disks only and ignores hard disks would go
unnoticed [9, 3]. The "Brain" virus, an early DOS
virus, is an example of a virus which ignores hard
disks.
Finally, integrity checkers need to be carefully
constructed so that the database of checksums is
not easily compromised by a virus. For example,
a virus might attempt to forge an entry in the integrity checker's signature database for a program
which is a target of infection.
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Recent Work
Companion
Macintosh

Viruses

and

the

Macintosh viruses infect application files, the System file (a file present on every boot able Macintosh disk which holds many resources used by the
operating system) or system extensions (small files
containing executable code which load every time
the Macintosh is started up and which add extra
functionality to the operating system). A very few
viruses which no longer work under recent releases
of the operating system infected the Macintosh by
more unusual means.
The Macintosh does not have any features
which correspond to the preference of DOS to
execute .COM files before .EXE files of the same
name (when the selection is not made explicit).
Nor does it feature the concept of a "path"
along which the operating system searches for
applications to execute if the desired application
is not in the current directory, as DOS does. So
a companion virus which does not actually alter
the target application is not implementable in the
same manner as under DOS.
However, it is possible to produce a virus with
many of the same characteristics as a companion
virus by manipulating a Macintosh disk's Desktop
Database. This attack seems not to have been
explored to date.
Macintosh files have both a file type (for
example, 'TEXT' denotes a plain text file) and
Each application should have a
a creator.
unique creator code, with which the files that the
application creates are marked. The "Finder" (the
part of the Macintosh operating system which
is responsible for presenting the graphical user

interface and managing user interactions) stores
information about file creators which allows it to
determine what application should be launched
when a document icon is double-clicked, and what
icon should be displayed for a file of a certain type
and creator.
When there is more than one application
present with the same creator, then the Finder
launches the application with the most recent
creation date when documents are double-clicked.
Applications which are launched as the result of a
user double-clicking a document icon are sent by
the operating system what is referred to as a high
level event or Apple Event, detailing which
document or documents are to be manipulated.
A viral application, with a more recent
creation date than the infected application, would
be launched by the Finder before the target
application, and would then have an opportunity
to infect further applications (for example, any
application currently running which has not
already been infected, or perhaps by scanning
the directory tree for uninfected applications,
processing only a few directories at a time so as
to avoid detection), or to perform other actions.
The viral application would then pass control to
the infected application. The Apple Event which
details the documents to be processed can easily
be passed on to the target application, so that
there is little outward evidence that anything
unusual has taken place.
This method of infection seems to function well
on hard drives with single and multiple partitions,
and should infect Macintosh file servers as well.
The ability of such a virus to conceal itself is
limited, being restricted to setting the position of
its document icon displayed by the Finder to some
point off the edge of the display window.
Like companion viruses of DOS, this attack
avoids altering any existing executable code or
system resources.

9.2

Macro Viruses

A traditional virus can be quite difficult to write,
as there are many factors which must be considered
if the virus is to work successfully and be able to
avoid detection on a wide range of systems running
a variety of software products.
Simple macro viruses, however, are not hampered by many of the same considerations. As an
exercise, a number of very simple macro viruses
were implemented by Horton. A first attempt required only a single macro, AutoClose. This attempt was very crude and would be easily detected
by an alert user, as infecting a document when it
was closed (causing the AutoClose macro to run)
required that the document be saved to disk with
the viral macro attached.

A later, slightly more sophisticated offering was
implemented using two macros, AutoOpen and
FileSaveAs. The AutoOpen macro would be
activated whenever an infected document is opened
in Word. If Word's Normal template is not already infected, the virus then infects the Normal
template, which is a global macro file visible by
all documents, by copying the viral macros to the
template.
From this point on, whenever the user selects
Save As . .• from the File menu, the FileSaveAs
macro (now attached to the Normal template) is
activated instead. It performs the same tasks as the
usual menu option, with the exception that before
the document is saved it is converted to a template
to which the viral macros are then attached.
Neither of the two macro viruses created implemented any "payload" macros, although the addition of a simple payload would be trivial. The
viruses are not remarkable for the techniques they
employ, which are found in other macro viruses.
The first implementation attempt of a macro
virus was accomplished in approximately eight
hours by a computer science graduate previously
unfamiliar with Microsoft Word and WordBasic.
No documentation was available other than the
"Help" system of Microsoft Word and a freely
available description of some common macro
viruses [15].
The second attempt required another hour, and
was sufficiently sophisticated that it would be able
to replicate unnoticed. A greater familiarity with
WordBasic would be required to write anything
more sophisticated, but the exercise illustrates the
fact that macro viruses, because of their ease of
construction, permit a much wider pool of computer users to write computer viruses in a very
short space of time.
Macro viruses are quite widespread and so samples are often easy to obtain. Furthermore, understanding the code of a macro virus (assuming that
the macros are not marked as ExecuteOnly) is very
much less difficult than interpreting the assembly
language in which non-macro viruses are typically
implemented. The study of techniques used to implement other macro viruses is one straightforward
method of improving virus writing.
More sophisticated macro viruses might
target specific computer systems by attempting
to "drop" a non-macro filesystem virus into
the target system, or perform other operating
system dependent actions. This would require
greater familiarity with WordBasic or other macro
languages than are demonstrated in a simple
macro virus, such as the ones created as a part of
this exercise.
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Summary

This paper has presented a definition of computer
viruses as the term is commonly used, as well as
attempting to explain the meaning of some other
terms, such as "worm", which are often closely associated with viruses. The various types of viruses
that currently exist and various methods used by
those viruses for infection have been explained, and
the types and numbers of viruses likely to be found
in the wild have been considered.
The various ways viruses currently use to hinder
detection and delay analysis once they have been
detected were discussed. Commonly available antivirus measures were explained, as well as faults and
problems that these methods are known to have.
Finally, some recent work on the ease of implementation of simple macro viruses and the implementation of a companion virus-type attack for the
Macintosh was discussed.
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